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This paper investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in
dynamic politico-economic equilibria. To this end, we develop a tractable model to analyze
the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice and the
evolution of political constituency. Analytical solutions are obtained to characterize Markov
perfect equilibria. Our main finding is that a right-wing ideology may increase the size of
government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countries confirm that after controlling for the
partisan eﬀect, there is a positive relationship between the right-wing political constituency
and the government size. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction, but hard to
explain by existing theories.
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1 Introduction
Modern political economy is designed to reveal the underlying mechanism of policy decision-
making. A salient feature in real world democracies is that policy attitudes are often driven
by motives that seem hard to reconcile with mere economic factors. The empirical literature
has long documented that ideology plays a key role in shaping policy preferences.1 Many
theoretical frameworks like the probabilistic voting model (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987)
also incorporate ideology as an important factor for political decisions. An ignored fact by the
existing theory, however, is the persistency of ideological shifts. For example, pro-redistribution
"leftist" policies were highly popular in the 1950s and 1960s, while a rightist mood appeared
to dominate in the late 1970s and 1980s.2 The impacts of such persistent ideological waves are
far from trivial. In particular, they lead to prospective changes in the government type and
the associated policy outcomes, which may influence private intertemporal choices and even
the distribution of future voters.3 Such variations in response to ideological shifts naturally
aﬀect choices of the incumbent government, indicating a distinct role of ideology in the policy
decision process.
This paper therefore aims to show explicitly how persistent ideology influences the deter-
mination of public policies. To this end, we construct a politico-economic model that has
the ability of capturing rich dynamic interactions among policies, private decisions, and the
evolution of the distribution of voters. Our main finding is that a right-wing ideology may
increase the size of government. The underlying mechanism is two-fold. First, a persistent
ideological shift towards the right implies that the right-wing be more likely to come to power
in the future. Since the right-wing imposes lower taxes on average, the ideological shock en-
courages investment by reducing expected future tax rates. This makes the investment less
elastic to the current tax rate and hence provides the incentive for the incumbent to increase
taxes. Moreover, the shock generates a self-reinforcing process on the distribution of future
1For instance, Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen (1980) show that symbolic attitude (mainly liberalism-conservatism
ideology and party identification) far outstripped all self-interest variables in terms of predicting support for
policies in the United States: the contribution of symbolic attitudes to R2 ranged between 10% and 17%,
while the contribution of self-interests never exceeds 4%. In addition, Levitin and Miller (1979), Knight (1985),
Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 1998), among many others, show that ideology turns out to be a significant predictor
for individuals’ voting choice in the U.S. presidential elections.
2See Robinson (1984), Robinson and Fleishman (1984) and Durr (1993) for discussions of the US survey
data.
3Recent theoretical work has shown that the evolution of political constituency can be endogenously driven by
private intertemporal choices in a full-fledged dynamic environment (e.g. Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten
and Zilibotti, 2003).
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voters. More investment results in a larger size of individuals in favor of the right-wing, which
increases further future election probabilities of the right-wing. The impact of ideology can
thus be amplified by this endogenous response of probabilities over future government types.
The model is primarily based on a tractable framework recently developed by Hassler,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007). There are two types of individual economic status, the rich
and poor. Individuals make human capital investment, which can increase their likelihood of
being rich. Two political parties run electoral competition. The right-wing and left-wing party,
modeled as citizen-candidates (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997), represent
the rich and poor, respectively. To incorporate ideology, we assume that a proportion of the
poor (rich) vote for the right-wing (left-wing) party. The discrepancy between individuals’
economic interests and their political preferences captures the impact of ideology on voting
behavior. The election is thus codetermined by two fundamentals in the economy: the size of
the rich (or poor) and the ideological state.
A distinctive feature of our model is that public policies, private investment and the distri-
bution of future voters are mutually aﬀected over time. To show how policies are determined in
this environment, we focus on Markov perfect equilibria, where the dynamic interactions can
are characterized by two fixed-points: the ideology-contingent distribution of future voters and
the ideology-contingent policy rules. Under quasi-linear preferences and uniformly distributed
ideological shocks, the equilibrium can be solved analytically.
The standard partisan model suggests that ideological shifts play no role in the policy
decision process, as long as the current type of government remains unchanged. By contrast,
our model implies a positive relationship between the government size and the right-wing
ideology within each political regime. It is then left for empirical study whether the positive
relationship holds in real democracies or is just a counterfactual result. We provide evidence
from an OECD panel that a more right-wing political constituency indeed leads to a larger
size of government, which is consistent with our prediction but hard to explain by existing
theories. Specifically, we find that one percentage increase in the vote share of right-wingers is
associated with an increase in the central government revenue GDP ratio of 0.17%. This result
is statistically significant and quite stable to a number of control variables and estimation
specifications.
There is a growing literature on the dynamics of government without commitment tech-
niques (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1998, Hassler et al., 2003, Hassler et al., 2007).4 This strand of
research, including the present paper, emphasizes the fact that in representative democracies,
4See also Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999).
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the incumbent government has limited abilities to commit to policies after the next election.
An important finding is that the multiplicity of equilibrium may appear due to the lack of
commitment. Although multiple equilibria per se are theoretically interesting, they are unable
to provide sharp empirical predictions. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing
a way of killing multiple equilibria. We show that suﬃcient ideological uncertainty rules out
the indeterminacy of belief in future political outcomes, which can easily be self-fulfilled in
the context without uncertainty. The unambiguous hypothesis on the relationship between
ideology and public policies allows empirical study to test again the theory.
The eﬀects of changes in the future government type on equilibrium outcomes have been
studied by some recent work such as Amador (2003) and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2007).5 However, much of the literature ignores a potential important channel that runs
from current policies back to future election probabilities. Azzimonti Renzo (2005) extends
the analysis by endogenizing the distribution of voters in a dynamic setup. Like Azzimonti
Renzo, we also allow current political and private decisions to aﬀect the evolution of political
constituency. The focus of our paper, however, is fundamentally diﬀerent. We are interested
in how persistent ideological shifts change policies, while ideological shocks are purely iid in
Azzimonti Renzo (2005), acting as a device of endogenizing election outcomes, and therefore
play a similar role as in the partisan model.
Although this paper aims to understand the influence of persistent ideology on the deter-
mination of public policies, it is also relevant for a long-standing issue in political science and
sociology concerning the causes of changes in political constituency. A sizable empirical liter-
ature shows that political identifications are related to lagged economic conditions.6 However,
few works have been done for formalizing the dynamic interaction between macroeconomy and
political cycles. Our model, based on rational choices of parties and individuals, contributes to
the literature by building a theoretical framework of analyzing changes in political constituency
in response to exogenous ideological shocks and endogenous public policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and solves a
static example. Section 3 gives the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Markov
perfect equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide a closed-form solution when the ideological shock
follows uniform distribution. Section 5 shows empirical evidence. Section 6 discusses the role
of ideological uncertainty on the multiplicity of equilibria. Section 7 concludes.
5Earlier researches include Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), among others, pro-
viding examples of strategic policy decision-making under future electoral uncertainty.
6See, among many others, Mueller (1970), Hibbs (1982), Norporth and Yantek (1983), Mackuen et al. (1989),
Weisberg and Smith (1991), Haynes and Jacobs (1994).
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2 The Model
2.1 The Model Economy
The model economy is primarily based on a tractable framework recently developed by Hassler
et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007). The economy is inhabited by an infinite sequence of
overlapping-generations. Each generation has a unit mass and lives two periods. There are two
types of old individuals endowed with diﬀerent productivity, referred to as the old poor and
rich, respectively. The wage of the old rich is normalized to unity and the poor earn zero. The
benefits from public good consumption g are identical across old individuals. The government
imposes a proportional income tax rate τo on the old. Let uou and uos be the utilities of the
old poor and rich, respectively. These are equal to
uout = a
ogt, (1)
uost = 1− τot + aogt, (2)
where ao ∈ (0, 2] is the constant marginal utility of public good for the old.7
Young individuals are ex-ante homogenous. They make a human capital investment h,
which increases the probability p of being rich in their life time. Without loss of generality, let
p = h ∈ [0, 1]. As old individuals, the wage of the young rich equals unity and the poor earn
zero. τy is the proportional income tax rate for young individuals. Assuming a linear-quadratic
preference over consumption and costs of human capital investment, the expected utility of a
young household is
uyt = ht (1− τ
y
t ) + a
ygt − h2t + βE[uot+1], (3)
where E is the expectation operator and β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the discount factor. ay is the
marginal utility of public good for the young. Since the probability of being rich when old is














The age-dependent taxation has its realistic counterparts. Many public programs and
tax policies have important age-dependent elements. In addition, the young and old may
evaluate public goods, such as public health care, in quite diﬀerent ways. Allowing for age-
7Assuming equal marginal utility of public spending across households is for notational convenience. It can
be argued that the poor care public spending more than the rich. The following results carry over to the case
in which ao is diﬀerent between the poor and the rich.
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dependent taxation also simplifies the analytical characterization, without making any funda-
mental change to the results.8
Through the wage structure, the old and young produce ht−1 and ht, respectively. Thus,
the aggregate output yt equals
yt = ht−1 + ht. (5)
Total tax incomes and public spending amount to τ otht−1 + τ
y
t ht and 2gt, respectively. We







2.2 The Political Decision Process
The sequence of tax rates is set through a repeated political decision process. We assume that
only old individuals vote. This captures, in an extreme fashion, the phenomenon that the
old are more influential in the determination of public policies.9 It would be observationally
equivalent to assume that voting occurs at the end of each period. Old individuals have no
interests at stake and thus, abstain from voting. For expositional ease, we keep the former
interpretation throughout the paper. We will show in Section 4.2 that a relaxation of this
assumption leads to no major changes in our main findings.
The left-wing and right-wing party, modeled as citizen-candidates, represent the old poor
and rich, respectively. The party candidates cannot credibly commit to any policy other than
that preferred by the group they represent. For simplicity, we assume zero entry cost.10 With
absence of ideology, the majority rule implies that election outcomes are deterministic and
solely depend on the distribution of old individuals’ economic situation. However, there are
numerous papers providing convincing evidence that, besides economic reasons, electorates’
ideological label also plays a significant role in their policy preference and voting choice. To
capture this phenomenon, we introduce another variable, namely the ideological state, to reflect
the discrepancy between electorates’ economic interests and their political preference. As a
consequence, election outcomes become codetermined by the distribution of old individuals’
8See Section 4.2 for more details.
9For instance, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) argue that the old have more influence in the political
decision process because they have a lower cost of time. Empirically, the voting turnout is indeed lower for
younger households (e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). See Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2006)
for more detailed discussions.
10For simplicity, we assume zero entry cost, which shuts down the entry game in the standard citizen candidate
model. Consequently, both the candidate representing the rich and that representing the poor will participate
in the electoral competition. However, we still regard the two-party system as a simplified citizen-candidate
model, since the party candidates cannot credibly commit to any policy platform other than their preferred
policies, as in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997).
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economic situation and the ideological state. Specifically, we assume that an ideological shock
can switch a proportion of the poor (rich) to the right-wing (left-wing) side in terms of voting
choice. Define the left-wingers (right-wingers) as old households voting for the left-wing (right-








st ≥ 1− ht−1
st ∈ (−ht−1, 1− ht−1)
st ≤ −ht−1
, (7)
where st is the ideological state at time t and ht−1 is the population of the old rich, or
equivalently, the human capital investment at time t − 1. A positive (negative) st switches
some of the poor (rich) to vote for the right-wing (left-wing) party. Thus, a high (low) st
refers to a more right-leaning (left-leaning) ideology. The right-wing party wins the election if
et > 12 . Otherwise the left-wing is elected.
11 Note that (7) ensures that et ∈ [0, 1] always holds.
When st takes an extreme value (either very high or very low), the economic determinant ht−1
is wiped oﬀ. Outside these "ages of extremes" (Hobsbawm, 1996), economic motives may
sway voters. Since ideological movements tend to be persistent (e.g. Robinson and Fleishman,
1984), st is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process, whose properties will be defined and
discussed below.12
It has been a long tradition in the literature of political economy that the poor (rich) is
synonymous to the left (right). This receives some empirical supports from the finding that
increased employment raises the popularity of the left government, while inflation reduces the
popularity of the right via the wealth eﬀect (e.g. Haynes and Jacob, 1994). However, it will be
far-fetched to believe that political constituency is purely determined by economic factors.13 In
fact, (7) can be thought of as a parsimonious way of capturing the influence of both economic
and ideological factors on the formation of political constituency.
The timing of events in each period is described as follows. Citizen candidates announce
their policy platforms at the beginning of each period. An ideological shock is realized after-
wards. The elected party then implements her preferred tax rates and public spending. Given
public policies, young individuals invest in human capital. Their being rich or poor is unfolded
after the investment.
11We assume that the left-wing comes into power if the proportion of left-wingers ties the right-wingers.
12The existence and uniqueness of the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium can easily be extended to an
AR(n) process with n > 1.
13Besides the extensive evidence provided by political scientists, it is worthy of mentioning a recent empirical
study from Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) suggesting the importance of ideology. Based on survey data from 10
OECD countries for 1975-1992, they find that "... respondents declare themselves to be happier when the party
in power has a similar ideological position to themselves, even after we control for key performance indicators
such as unemployment, inflation and income." (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005, pp.378)
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2.3 Two Eﬀects of Ideology
The right-wing party sets τot so as to maximize the utility of the rich uost in (2), subject to
the balanced-budget constraint (6). The assumption that ao ≤ 2 is suﬃcient for the right-
wing to set τot = 0. The left-wing sets τot by maximizing uout in (1), which is equivalent to
maximizing fiscal revenues τotht−1+ τ
y
t ht. Since ht−1 is predetermined and τ
o
t does not distort
young individuals’ human capital investment, the left-wing will set τot = 1. In other words, the
left-wing government eliminates the income inequality of old individuals by imposing a 100%





if et ≤ 12
otherwise
. (8)
The disagreement on tax τot exhibits the feature of a two-party system. Despite the conflict of
interest between left-wingers and right-wingers in terms of τot , their preferences on τ
y
t are per-
fectly aligned: attaining the top of the Laﬀer curve to maximize taxes from young individuals.
This is because citizen candidates only represent the interests of the old rich and poor. None
of them care about the welfare of the young.14 So τyt solves
τyt = argmaxTt, (9)
where Tt ≡ τytht. Three remarks are in order. First, the incumbent at time t would be better oﬀ
if she could promise τot+1 = 0 to encourage human capital investment ht. Without commitment
techniques, however, the promise is not credible since future polices are repeatedly decided by
the winners of future elections. So τot+1 must follow the binary rule (8). Second, in the present
setup, both parties would like to see the right-wing being elected in the next period, since
τot+1 = 0 in the right-wing regime encourages investment and thus, enlarges the tax base.
The lack of reelection concern is consistent with the ”short-sighted” citizen candidates only
living one period.15 Finally, the political parties would disagree on the tax rate imposed on
the young if the government were not allowed to adopt age-dependent taxation. As will be
discussed later, the disagreement will not leave qualitative changes to our main results.
We now distinguish in our model two channels for ideology to aﬀect policies. Ideology
aﬀects election and therefore the current government type. The eﬀect of an ideological shock
on policies through this channel is analogous to that in the standard partisan models and will
14The indiﬀerence between τyt preferred by the leftist and rightist seems reasonable since the young are
homogenous when candidates implement their policies.
15 In an earlier version of this paper, we consider the case in which the incumbent has reelection concern by
assuming politicians care about future policies. This gives rise to the "opportunistic" motive and the "strategic"
motive, which generate two opposite eﬀects, as in Jonsson (1997). However, the two opposite eﬀects largely
cancel out with each other and do not aﬀect our main results.
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be referred to as the partisan eﬀect. The second channel, the focus of the paper, governs
how policies response to endogenous changes in private decisions and the distribution of future
voters driven by an ideological shock in equilibrium. The eﬀect of ideology through this channel
is referred to as the equilibrium eﬀect. As a warm-up exercise to facilitate the intuition, let
us first study a static example with no private intertemporal trade-oﬀ. This helps identify the
partisan eﬀect of ideology.
2.3.1 A Static Example: the Partisan Eﬀect of Ideology
In this static example, we assume the probability of being rich in old age p to be exogenous.
The corresponding politico-economic equilibrium is straightforward. The policy rule of τot
follows (8). According to (3), young individuals’ human capital investment solves
h = arg max
hˆ∈[0,1]






We will continue to drop the time subscript when it does not create any confusion. (11)
shows that private choice is independent of ideology. Substituting (11) into (9), we obtain an









(8) and (12) give the policy rules. Assuming away intertemporal trade-oﬀs shuts down the link
between ideology and the current distorting policy τyt . Since e = p+s, combining (8) and (12),
the share of government spending or revenue can be computed as a percentage of aggregate







if s ≤ 12 − p
otherwise
, (14)
where γ measures the size of government. If the ideology shock s ≤ 1/2−p, the left-wing party,
representing the interests of the poor, wins the election and implements higher taxes and larger
spending for redistributive reasons. Otherwise, the right-wing wins and imposes lower taxes
for the sake of the rich. Since the impact of ideology is limited to election outcomes, the
diﬀerence in γ reflects the partisan eﬀect of ideology on policies. Particularly, a right-wing
ideology may increase the government size by changing the political regime from the left-wing
to the right-wing.16 The implication from the partisan eﬀect is thus in accordance with the
16The ratio of γ in the left-wing regime to γ in the right-wing regime is equal to 1 + 8p > 1.
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standard prediction of partisan theory.
3 The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
This section analyses the benchmark setup, where the probability of being rich in old age is
endogenously determined by human capital investment, i.e., p = h. Since the investment and
the future political outcomes are mutually aﬀected, the private intertemporal trade-oﬀ turns
out to be much more complicated than (10) in the static example. Denote x and x0 as the
variable x in the current and following period, respectively. The expected utility uy in (3)
implies that h depends on E[τo0]. According to the binary tax rule (8), E [τo0] is equal to
1 − π, where π ≡ Pr (e0 > 1/2) denotes the right-wing’s probability of being elected in the
next period. Alternatively, π can be considered as a variable characterizing the distribution of
future voters. Plugging (8) into (3), young individuals solve
h = arg max
hˆ∈[0,1]
(1− τy + βπ) hˆ− hˆ2. (15)
The utility from public good is irrelevant for the decision h, due to the atomistic individuals
taking g and g0 as given. (15) yields
h =
1− τy + βπ
2
. (16)
In addition to the negative eﬀect of τy on h in (11), (16) says that h increases in π, i.e. the
probability for a right-wing government to be elected, since such a government will adopt
the tax-free policy for old individuals. Moreover, (16) provides a way of pinning down π in
















The equilibrium probability π is thus a fixed point of equation (17). In particular, the link
between h and π implies that an ideological shock generate a self-reinforcing process on the
distribution of future voters. An increase of s (a right-wing ideology) leads to a high π and
therefore a high h. More human capital investment, in turn, increases π as more individuals
will be rich and in favor of the right-wing in the next period. We shall see explicitly in Section
4 how the eﬀect of ideology is amplified through this process.
3.1 The Ideology-Contingent Distribution of Future Voters
Before characterizing the fixed-point problem, we first specify the properties of the stochastic
process of s as follows. The density function is defined by f : R2 → [0,∞) with
R
f (s0, s) ds0 = 1
9
for any given s. By (17), we know that π depends on τy and the probability of the future
ideological state s0, which in turn is contingent on the current ideological state s. Hence, π
can be written as a function of τy and s, π : [0, 1] × R → [0, 1], which solves the following
functional equation implied by (17):










The existence of the ideology-contingent probability π (τy, s) can easily be obtained by the
following assumptions. Define X ≡ [s, s¯], where −∞ < s < s¯ <∞. Assume
A1: s0 and s ∈ X.
A2: f (s0, s) is bounded and uniformly continuous.
Lemma 1 Assume A1 and A2. Then there exists a uniformly continuous function π (τy, s)
that solves (18).
Proof : See the appendix.
A2 is only a suﬃcient condition for the existence. π (τy, s) can exist under discontinuous
distributions, as shall be seen in Section 4. The following assumption gives the suﬃcient
condition for the uniqueness of π (τy, s).
A3: f (s0, s) < 2/β for all s0 and s ∈ X.
Lemma 2 Assume A1 and A3. Then there exists a unique π (τy, s) that solves (18).
Proof : See the appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that suﬃcient ideological uncertainty can rule out the indeterminacy of
beliefs, which features a number of recent researches on dynamic politico-economic equilib-
rium with endogenous identity of the policymaker (e.g. Hassler et al., 2003). We will relax
assumption A3 and study the multiplicity of equilibria in Section 6.
Plugging the ideology-contingent probability π (τy, s) into (16) gives
h (τy, s) =
1− τy + βπ (τy, s)
2
. (19)










h (τy, s) + s0
0
if s0 ≥ 1− h (τy, s)
if s0 ∈ (−h (τy, s) , 1− h (τy, s))
if s0 ≤ −h (τy, s)
. (20)
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3.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Given the ideology-contingent probability π (τy, s) solved from (18) and the individual invest-
ment strategy (19), an incumbent sets τy according to (9). Let T (τy, s) ≡ h (τy, s) τy. The
problem is
τy (s) = arg max
τy∈[0,1]
T (τy, s) . (21)
Two remarks are in order. First, the theorem of maximum implies that τy : R → [0, 1] be an
upper hemi-continuous mapping. Second, τy only depends on the current ideological state s.
One may guess that τy should also depend on the state of political constituency e = s+ h−1,
as τo in the Markovian tax rule (8). In fact, e or the identity of the incumbent has no influence
on τy, since the objectives of two parties over τy are perfectly aligned: maximizing tax revenue
from the young.
Compared with the ideology-independent policy rule (12) in the static example, it can be
found that τy (s) reflects the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology, i.e., the impact of ideology on the
policy decision-making via endogenous changes of private choices and political constituency
in equilibrium. The equilibrium eﬀect appears when individuals condition human capital in-
vestment on ideology-contingent probabilities over future political outcomes. More specifically,
ideological movements may aﬀect policy decision-making via the ideology-contingent elasticity
of tax base h:
 (τy, s) =
τy − βτy∂π (τy, s) /∂τy
1− τy + βπ (τy, s) , (22)
where  denotes the absolute value of the elasticity of the tax base with respect to τy. An
immediate observation is that, given ∂π (τy, s) /∂τy,  is decreasing in π. That is to say, the
current tax base tends to be less elastic when the future voting is more favorable for the right-
wing. The intuition is straightforward. Since τo in the right-wing regime is lower than in the
left-wing regime, a more rightist future political constituency implies a low expected τo0 and
hence encourages the current investment. This leads to a less elastic tax base.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, in which private and public choices are conditioned
to payoﬀ-relevant state variables.17 There are two state variables in our model: the ideological
state s and the proportion of right-wingers e = s+ h−1. These two state variables are payoﬀ-
relevant since they determine the current election and thus, policy outcomes. So the Markovian
political equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 A (Markov perfect) political equilibrium is a set of mappings τo (e), τy (s),
π (τy (s) , s), and h (τy (s) , s) such that:
17The dynamic game in our model also allows for equilibria with trigger strategies.
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(1) τo (e) follows (8);
(2) given τy (s), the probability of election π (τy (s) , s) solves (18);
(3) given π (τy (s) , s), the human capital investment h (τy (s) , s) follows (19);
(4) given h (τy (s) , s), the incumbent solves τy (s) by (21).
4 An Analytical Solution
In this section, we provide a closed-form solution of the Markov perfect equilibrium. The
complete characterization of the equilibrium reveals the dynamic interactions among political
constituency, distortionary policy decision-making and individuals’ intertemporal choice. We
assume that s0 follows an AR(1) process with a symmetric uniformly distributed innovation18
s0 = ρs+ ε0. (23)
The ideological shock is stationary and persistent, i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1). The density of ε equals










if s0 ∈ (ρs− z, ρs+ z)
otherwise
. (24)
Now the functional equation (18) becomes















2 ≤ ρs− z
if τ
y−βπ(τy,s)
2 ∈ (ρs− z, ρs+ z)
if τ
y−βπ(τy,s)
2 ≥ ρs+ z
. (25)
The linearity makes the analytical solution straightforward. Assumption A3 implies that z >
β/4, which gives the suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of π (τy, s) under the uniform
distribution (24). In this section, we assume that z > β/4. It can be shown that z > β/4 is
also necessary. The opposite case z < β/4, which produces multiple equilibria, will be studied
in Section 6.19 Solving (25) yields:








if τy ≤ λ− (s)
if τy ∈
¡
λ− (s) , λ+ (s)
¢
if τy ≥ λ+ (s)
, (26)
where λ− (s) ≡ 2 (ρs− z) + β and λ+ (s) ≡ 2 (ρs+ z). Note that λ+ (s) > λ− (s) as long as
z > β/4. For notational convenience, we refer to λ+ (s) ≤ 0, or equivalently s ≤ −z/ρ, as
18Analytical solution is also available, though much more tedious, under more general setups. For example,
s0 follows an AR(n) process with the innovation that has a piecewise linear cumulative distribution function.
19π (τy, s) does not exist if z = β/4. The non-existence of π (τy, s) is due to the fact that the uniform
distribution (24) is not continuous and thus, does not satisfy assumption A2.
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the left-dominating region, where the left-wing will be elected with probability one in the next
period, irrespective of τy. Symmetrically, λ− (s) ≥ 1, or equivalently s ≥ ((1− β) /2 + z) /ρ, is
referred to as the right-dominating region, where the right-wing will be elected with probability
one under any τy.
It immediately follows that ∂π (τy, s) /∂s ≥ 0 by (26). A higher s leads to a higher expec-
tation of s0, which tends to increase the probability of the right-wing being elected in the next
period. Such an eﬀect is amplified through the self-reinforcing process on π via private invest-
ment h as discussed above. To see this, let us assume that voting is completely determined by
ideology as in the static example. Then π becomes purely exogenous and (26) reduces to















if s ≤ − zρ
. (27)
A comparison between (26) and (27) shows that the marginal eﬀect of ideology on π is increased
from ρ/2z to 2ρ/ (4z − β).
Introducing private investment as a determinant of future political constituency also allows













Thus, ∂π (τy, s) /∂τy ≤ 0. Intuitively, a low τy encourages human capital investment and
increases the size of rich individuals in the next period. This makes the right-wing more likely
to win the next election. In the left-dominating (right-dominating) region with λ+ (s) ≤ 0
(λ− (s) ≥ 1), however, τy cannot aﬀect the policymaker’s identity in the next period and
hence, the probability π is independent of τy.
The ideology-contingent probability over future political outcomes gives the ideology-contingent
elasticity of tax base, which plays a central role in the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology. Using
(26) and (28), (22) yields









if τy ≤ λ− (s)
if τy ∈
¡
λ− (s) , λ+ (s)
¢
if τy ≥ λ+ (s)
, (29)
where κ (τy, s) ≡ (1 + β/ (4z − β)) τy/ (1− τy + β (2 (ρs+ z)− τy) / (4z − β)). (29) illustrates
how ideology aﬀects the elasticity of tax base h. First, the tax base is more elastic in the left-
dominating region ( = τy/ (1− τy)) than in the right-dominating region ( = τy/ (1 + β − τy)).
In the left-dominating (right-dominating) region, the expectation on τo = 1 (τo = 0) discour-
ages (encourages) human capital investment and hence, makes the tax base more (less) elastic.
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The same mechanism holds outside these extreme cases; it is straightforward that κ (τy, s) is
decreasing in s. To conclude, a right-wing ideology tends to make the tax base h less elastic.
As shall be seen below, the ideology-contingent elasticity plays a key role in the determination
of taxes.
Now we are well-equipped to solve for τy (s). By (19) and (26), tax revenues from young
individuals are




TR (τy, s) ≡ 12 (1− τy + β) τy
TM (τy, s) ≡ 12
³
















λ+ (s) , 1
¤ . (30)
Taking s as the state variable, τy can be pinned down by maximizing the piecewise quadratic
function T (τy, s). A characterization of the ideology-contingent policy rule τy (s) is given by

































if s > sR
, (31)
where
φ (s) ≡ (2β (ρs+ z) + 4z − β) /8z, s1 ≡
p




16z2 − 6βz + 4z − β
ρ (16z − 2β) , s
R ≡ (1− β) /4 + z
ρ
.
Proof : See the appendix.
To simplify the statement in the paper, we assume that z ≥ zˆ. The other case where
z ∈ (β/4, zˆ) will be investigated in the appendix, which delivers qualitatively similar results.20
Panel A and B in Figure 1 plot the policy rule τy (s) and the ideology-contingent probability
π (τy (s) , s) under the benchmark parameter values, which are set to z = 0.50, ρ = 0.50 and
β = 1.00.21
20However, there will be no electoral uncertainty if z < zˆ.
21Given z and ρ, we calibrate β such that the long-run average h is equal to 0.5, which gives the symmetric
support for the left- and right-wing regimes in the long run.
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[Insert Figure 1]
In the left-dominating region, ∂π (τy, s) /∂τ y = 0, private investment and distortionary
taxes have no eﬀect on future election outcomes. (30) reduces to a quadratic function (1− τy) τy/2
and the incumbent sets τy = 1/2.
For λ+ (s) > 0 or equivalently s > −z/ρ, ideology becomes less hospitable for the left-
wing and private investment plays a role in probabilities over future political outcomes. Taxes
need to be adjusted accordingly. Specifically, a low τy can increase investment h and thus,
the probability for the rightist of being elected in the next period. In this case, the future
policymaker’s identity becomes endogenous and dependent on τy. Then, the corresponding
objective function T is composed of two diﬀerent quadratic functions, T = TM for low τy
and T = TL for high τy. The emergence of the eﬀect of τy on the future election probability
π makes the tax base h more elastic, as shown by (29). This provides the incentive for an
incumbent to cut the tax rate. However, if λ+ (s) is close to zero, the incumbent needs to cut
τy substantially to aﬀect π and h. Proposition 1 shows that for s < s1, it is still optimal to
set τy = 1/2 (see the upper panel of Figure 2).
[Insert Figure 2]
As s moves rightward, the future election outcome becomes more easily aﬀected by tax-
cutting. Particularly, when s reaches the threshold point s1, we have an equalized maximum















This can directly be seen from the lower panel in Figure 2. The indiﬀerence produces multi-
plicity and discontinuity of τy at s1.22 For a small increment ξ in s, the incumbent will cut τy




, to attain the top of the Laﬀer curve.




, where both parties have positive
probabilities to win the next election. This is referred to as "the competitive political region".
In this region, τy is linearly increasing in s. That is to say, a more right-leaning ideology is
associated with a higher distortionary tax rate. The somewhat surprising result is due to the
decreasing elasticity of h with respect to s, as shown by κ (τy, s) in (29). A high s increases the
probability for a right-wing government of winning the next election, via its persistent impact
22More specifically, τy (s) is not lower hemi-continuous. The theorem of maximum (e.g. Stokey and Lucas,
1989, pp. 62) only ensures that τy (s) is upper hemi-continuous.
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on the future ideological state s0. This reduces the expected taxes and makes the current tax
base less elastic. The lower elasticity provides the incentive for an incumbent to raise τy.
Ideology has an even greater impact on τy for s ∈
¡
sMH , s
R¤ than for s ∈ £s1, sMH ¤.23 Under
a modest s, τy has a negative eﬀect on π.24 When s is suﬃciently right-leaning, however,
reducing τy has no eﬀect on π since π has reached its upper boundary. The silence of tax-
cutting on π amplifies the impact of s on τy.
In the right-dominating region, young individuals rationally expect the right-wing to win
the next election under any τy. Consequently, (30) reduces to a quadratic function TR, which
solves τy = (1 + β) /2.
To conclude, the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology on public policy, reflected by τy (s), turns out
to be very diﬀerent from the partisan eﬀect in the static example. Particularly, if we focus on




, the equilibrium eﬀect induces a positive relationship
between the distortionary tax rate and the right-wing ideology. The positive relationship boils
down to the ideology-contingent elasticity of the tax base: investment responses less sensitively
to the current tax rate when a persistent right-wing ideology leads to lower expected future
taxes.
Given the distortionary tax rule τy (s) and the ideology-contingent probability π (τy (s) , s),
human capital investment h follows













2 − (ρs− z)
1+β
4









if s > sR
. (33)
The proof is straightforward and immediately follows from (19), (26) and (31). h increases









. Panel C in
Figure 1 plots the inverted U-shaped h. The non-monotonicity of h is due to the fact that a
rightward ideological shift has two opposite eﬀects on h. First, it helps the right-wing win the
next election and thus raises π, which has a positive impact on h. However, a high π makes





, the positive eﬀect dominates the negative eﬀect and h increases in s. For


















R¤, however, the positive eﬀect disappears since π has reached its upper boundary.
The remaining negative eﬀect produces a decreasing h.
4.1 The Size of Government
Policy rules (8) and (31) capture the partisan and equilibrium eﬀects of ideology on public
policy, respectively. Now these two eﬀects are aggregated. The size of government can be
written as





if s ≤ 12 − h (s−1)
otherwise
, (34)
where τy (s) and h (s) follow (31) and (33), respectively. Note that γ is not only aﬀected by
the current ideological state s, but also dependent of the past ideological state s−1, which
determines the size of the rich. Figure 3 plots the government size γ with diﬀerent s−1.
An immediate observation is that, driven by the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology, a rightward
ideological shift increases γ within each political regime.
[Insert Figure 3]
To investigate in a straightforward way the implications of ideology, we simulate the model
and use simulated data to estimate the following linear equation.
γ = a0 + a1R+ a2s+ a3s−1 + ζ, (35)
where R is a dummy variable which equals zero and one for the left- and right-wing regime,
respectively. a0 is a constant and ζ is an error term. Although simple, (35) reveals two eﬀects
of ideology, the main predicton of our theory. The coeﬃcients a1 and a2 capture the partisan
eﬀect and the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology, respectively.
We run 1100 simulations repeatedly for 50 times with the benchmark parameterization.
The estimated results are reported in column 1 of Table 1.25 R2 amounts to 0.98, indicating
a high degree of fitness of the linear specification. As expected, a1 is negative and a2 is
positive. a3 turns out to be statistically insignificant. (33) shows that h−1 is a non-monotonic
function of s−1. The resulting ambiguous correlation between s−1 and the identity of political
regime makes a3 insignificant. In fact, dropping s−1 from the regression has little eﬀect on the
estimates of a1 and a2, as stated in column 2 of Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
25The first 100 observations are discarded to eliminate the eﬀect of the initial ideological state.
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Our theory also has implication on the relationship between government sizes and political
constituency. This can directly be seen by estimating
γ = b0 + b1R+ b2e+ ε, (36)
where e is the proportion of right-wingers and ε is an error term. Column 3 of Table 1 reports
the result. Since e is linear in s outside "ages of extremes" (see equation 7), it should not be
surprising that (35) and (36) give similar results. In particular, b2 is positive. In words, an
increase in the right-wing voter share leads to a larger size of government within each political
regime.
4.1.1 Sensitivity to Model Parameters
Now we check the parameter sensitivity of the coeﬃcients of interests a2 and b2. Specifically,
we consider sensitivity analysis to two key model parameters: z and ρ. Panel A of Figure
4 shows that an increase in z, implying more volatile ideology, tends to reduce a2 and b2.





dτy (s) /ds = βρ/4z, mitigates as z increases. Note that a2 > 0 and b2 > 0 hold even in the










Panel B shows the impact of changing ρ. When ρ = 0, the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology
goes away. This implies a2 = b2 = 0. Increasing ρ from zero leads to positive a2 and b2, due to
the rising equilibrium eﬀect of ideology. However, the eﬀect of ρ on a2 is non-monotonic. On









shrinks with larger ρ, suggesting a lower probability for the equilibrium
eﬀect of ideology to be functioning. This reduces the estimate of a2. In the limiting case as ρ




goes to zero since s→ −∞ and s¯→∞. The
estimate of a2 is then completely determined by policy outcomes in the polar cases featuring no
electoral uncertainty, which implies a zero a2. These two opposite eﬀects result in an inverted-
U shape of a2; the first eﬀect is dominating for small ρ and the second eﬀect is dominating for
large ρ.
Although there are similar opposite eﬀects of ρ on b2, the aggregate impact turns out to be
monotonic. Diﬀerent from the ideological state s, the proportion of right-wingers e is bounded
between 0 and 1. Consequently, the estimate of b2 is much less aﬀected by policy outcomes in
the non-competitive political regimes.
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To conclude, the result that a2 > 0 and b2 > 0 is robust to a wide range of parameter
values. This allows us to test our theory against the standard partisan theory predicting zero
a2 and b2.
4.2 Robustness
We have analytically characterized the Markov perfect equilibrium under two important as-
sumptions, i.e., old politicians and age-dependent taxation. In this subsection, we discuss in
order whether our main findings are robust to changes in these assumptions.
The first assumption seems too extreme as old politicians completely ignore welfare of the
young in our model. A natural extension is to assume that politicians are altruistic towards
the young. The political objective function (21) can therefore be written as
τy (s) = arg max
τy∈[0,1]
T (τy, s) + ωuy (τy, s) , (37)
where ω ≥ 0 stands for the intensity of altruism. Although the analysis becomes much more
complicated, the results remain qualitatively similar.26 Nevertheless, two quantitative changes
are worthy of being mentioned. First, τy in the extended model is lower that that in the
benchmark model. Second, the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology, ∂τy/∂s, turns out to be larger.
The underlying intuitions are rather straightforward. A positive ω introduces a new ingredient
in the policy decision process: the impact of τy on welfare of the young. This additional
marginal disutility leads to lower τy. Moreover, since a right-wing ideology encourages human
capital investment by reducing expected future taxes, the marginal disutility of τy for the
young is actually decreasing in s. This provides the incentive for politicians to increase further
τy in response to a right-wing ideological shock.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that the government can condition
taxes on age. Although age-dependent taxation has its realistic counterpart and substantially
simplifies the analysis, this assumption is not innocuous. Since both parties are perfectly
aligned with τy, the partisan eﬀect only works on the non-distortionary tax rate τo. More
crucially, one may wonder whether the binary taxation (8), which obviously overstates the
partisan eﬀect of ideology, is crucial for the positive relationship between the distortionary tax
rate and the right-wing ideology. In an earlier version of this paper (Song, 2005), we assess
the robustness of the main result under age-independent taxation and find that imposing the
weaker policy instrument does not lead to any major change. The intuition is again simple.
Age-independent tax rates in the right-wing regime are on average lower than those in the
26We solve the extended model numerically. Details are available upon request.
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left-wing regime. A rightward ideological shift, as in the case with age-dependent taxation,
reduces the expected tax rate by increasing the probability for the right-wing to win the next
election. This encourages investment and induces an incumbent to behave in a similar way as
described above.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the main prediction of our theory concerning the eﬀects of ideology on
the determination of public policies. A novel prediction of the theory is that after controlling
for the partisan eﬀect, a more right-leaning ideology leads to a larger size of government due to
the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology. One of the major diﬃculties in testing the prediction is how
to measure ideology. A commonly used measure of ideology in the literature of political science
is self-placement scores of the left-right position from opinion polls or survey data (Inglehart,
1990). This approach obviously suﬀers from limited comparable observations across countries
and time.27 Our estimation strategy takes an alternative approach. The idea is based on
regression equation (36); the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology can be inferred from its relationship
to the proportion of right-wingers for which data exist.
5.1 Data and Specification
We use the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, assembled by Huber et al. (1997) and
updated by Brady et al. (2004). The sample consists of at most 41 years of observations
(1960-2000) from 18 democracies, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.28
Following Persson (2002), Persson and Tabellini (2004), among many others, we use cen-
tral government expenditure (or revenue) as a percentage of GDP, denoted by CGEXP (or
CGREV ), to measure the size of government. We use the percentage of vote for the right
parties (RV OT ) as the empirical counterpart of the proportion of right-wingers in the model.
A dummy variable, R, is created for controlling the partisan eﬀect. We let R = 1 if both shares
of seats of the right and center parties in parliament and government are larger than 66.6%.
R = 0 otherwise. In all 738 observations, 201 are associated with R = 1. In words, about 27%
27Moreover, it has long been questioned whether all respondents have consistent views on the location of the
"left" and "right" (e.g. Levitin and Miller, 1979).
28All the data used in this subsection are from the Comparative Welfare States Data set, which is available
at http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm.
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governments in the sample are labeled as the right-wing.29
Based on (36), we estimate regressions in which policy outcomes Yit are linear functions of
R and RVOT .
Yit = b0i + b
1Rit + b2RV OTit + φXt + εit, (38)
where b0i is a country-specific eﬀect and Xt is a set of year dummies to control for the unob-
served common shocks. We also run this regression with some additional explanatory variables
containing country-specific factors. Specifically, we use the log of real GDP per capital (Y PC)
to control the potential impact of Wagner’s Law, i.e., the size of government will rise as income
rises. Deviation of Y PC from its trend (obtained by the HP filter), denoted by Y GAP , is
added, as government tends to implement countercyclical policies to smooth economic fluc-
tuations. Other control variables include the unemployment rate (UNEMPL), export plus
import share of GDP (OPEN), proportion of population over 65 (POP65O) and below 14
(POP14U), which are constantly adopted in recent empirical studies (e.g. Razin et al., 2004,
Persson and Tabellini, 2005).
5.2 Results
Table 2 gives estimation results from fixed eﬀects regressions. We start with column 1, where
the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology is shut down by excluding RVOT in (38). This parallels the
standard approach for testing the partisan eﬀect. The baseline regression (column 1) shows





increases from 0.82 to 1.05 and becomes significant at 10% level.
According to the point estimation, switching from the right-wing regime to the left-wing causes
government expenditure to increase by about one percent of GDP. The magnitude of the
partisan eﬀect in OECD countries is roughly in line with previous findings.30 Column 3 and
4 display the same regressions on CGREV . There is a much stronger partisan eﬀect for




amounts to 1.8 and is significant at 1% level. This
result is rather stable, irrespective of whether additional explanatory variables are included.
[Insert Table 2]
Our main finding is in column 5 to 8. The baseline regression (column 5) shows that b2,
the coeﬃcient on RVOT , is positive and significant at the level of 1%. Including additional
29A similar criteria is adopted by Woldendorp et al. (1993, 1998), where R = 1 is referred to as the "right-wing
dominance" regime.
30 In Blais et al. (1993), such a shift from the right to the left will increase government spending by 0.7
percentage point. In Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), the increase by a shift from a modest right government
to a modest left government amounts to 1.6 percentage point in the steady state.
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explanatory variables reduces the estimate of b2 substantially (column 6). The statistical
significance, however, is at the same level. The point estimation in column 6 implies that given
the incumbent’s political identity, one percentage increase in the vote share for right parties
will on average increase government expenditure by 0.06 percent of GDP. the equilibrium eﬀect
of ideology is more evident in column 7 and 8 where we use central government revenue as an
indicator of government size. One percentage increase in RVOT will lead to 0.17 percentage
increase in CGREV when additional explanatory variables are added. These results provide
statistical evidence in favor of the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology.
The positive b2 does not suggest right-wing governments to be larger. In fact, controlling
for political constituency reveals a larger partisan eﬀect, and b1 that is significant in column
1 to 4 remains significant in column 5 to 8. This suggests that left-wing governments indeed
have a greater preference over public spending. The co-existence of the two eﬀects is essential
for the theory, since the equilibrium eﬀect cannot exist without the partisan eﬀect.
5.3 Robustness
A key issue is whether RVOT is an appropriate proxy of political constituency. Party ideology,
on which RVOT is completely silent, is clearly an important dimension of ideology. Our model
adopts a two-party system for simplicity. However, real democracies have much more complex
political systems. One country may have several left (right) parties with diﬀerent ideological
positions from each other. Taken into consideration this issue, we use the index developed
by Kim and Fording (1998, 2003) as an alternative proxy of ideology. The advantage of the
index is that it reflects not only changes of vote, but also changes of party ideology.31 Using
the Kim-Fording index gives no qualitative changes to the results. The coeﬃcients that are
significant remain significant.32
Our panel regressions contain 18 countries. It is important to check the sensitivity of the
results to individual countries. To this end, we run all the regressions in Table 2 excluding one
country at a time. In every regression, the coeﬃcients that are significant at the 5% level are
still significant at the same level no matter which country is excluded.
Some evidence shows that fiscal policies legislated in the states typically take one year to
be eﬀective (Poterba, 1994, Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995). It is not clear whether the same
mechanism carries over to the sample of OECD countries. Be as it may, we replace Rit in the
regressions with one-year lagged variable Rit−1. The results change only marginally and the
31Kim and Fording first estimate party ideology, based on party manifesto statements, and then use the
percentage of the vote received by each party to construct an adjusted index for the median ideological position.
32The results are available upon request.
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statistical significance for the coeﬃcients of interest is never aﬀected.
Finally, it has not yet been addressed that there might be omitted variables aﬀecting
political variables and fiscal outcomes simultaneously. Taking this concern, we choose one-year
lagged political variables Rit−1 and RV OTit−1 to instrument the current political variables Rit
and RVOTit. These lagged variables are highly correlated with the respective current values,
and expected to be independent of current policy outcomes. Table 3 reports the results of
reestimating (38) using Two-State-Least Squares (2SLS). First note that the 2SLS estimates of
b1 are significant in all cases. There is some evidence for the endogeneity of R since a Hausman
test rejects the null hypothesis in column 3 and 4 at the level of 10%. Second, though the
endogeneity leads to a significant underestimation of the partisan eﬀect, the endogeneity of
RV OT is much less severe. Application of the Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis.
The 2SLS estimate of b2 becomes statistically insignificant in column 2, but remains highly
significant in all other cases.
[Insert Table 3]
To conclude, we find a significantly positive relationship between government revenue and
the right-wing vote share, after controlling for the partisan eﬀect. The point estimate is quite
stable to a number of control variables and specifications. The empirical finding is in line
with our theoretical prediction, but hard to explain by the existing literature. An interesting
question left is why the positive relationship is less evident for government expenditure? Recall
that in the model, the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology is mainly driven by the government’s target
of tax revenue maximization. Therefore, as an indicator of tax policy, CGREV is perhaps a
better measure of γ for identifying the equilibrium eﬀect of ideology.33
6 Multiple Equilibria
In the previous sections, equilibria have been shown to be determinate. We regard this as an
important progress, since much of the previous related literature (including Hassler et al., 2003)
is plagued by multiple equilibria and indeterminacies, which undermine the ability of the theory
to provide sharp empirical implications. The multiplicity should not be surprising. When the
government cannot make a commitment on future policies, individuals must condition their
choice on self-fulfilled expectations, which are usually not unique. Introducing ideology has
33Although government expenditures and revenues usually move in tandem, imbalances between expenditures
and revenues occur occasionally since governments may run deficits, which is totally assumed away in the theory.
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been proved useful to eliminate multiplicity. In this section, we show that enough ideological
uncertainty is indeed needed. Else, multiple Markov equilibria reemerge.
If z < β/4, (26) no longer holds. Instead, (25) solves








if τy ≤ λ− (s)
if τy ∈
¡
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¢
if τy ≥ λ+ (s)
, (39)
where λ+ (s) < λ− (s) under z < β/4. (39) implies that the ideology-contingent π (τy, s) is not
unique for τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
. The expectation (τy − 2 (ρs+ z)) / (β − 4z) seems bizarre
since it implies that ∂π/∂τy > 0 and ∂π/∂s < 0. Both signs are counter-intuitive and hard to
explain. However, the indeterminacy of π (τy, s) still remains even if we rule out the counter-
intuitive self-fulfilled expectation (τy − 2 (ρs+ z)) / (β − 4z) by requiring the expectation to
be monotonic:




if τy ≤ λ− (s)
if τy ≥ λ+ (s) . (40)
Since λ+ (s) < λ− (s), π is indeterminate for τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
.
The indeterminacy of expectations opens the door to multiple Markov perfect equilibria.
To see this, let us pick up a particular expectation rule satisfying (40)




if τy < λ+ (s) + ψ
if τy ≥ λ+ (s) + ψ ,
where ψ ∈ [0, β − 4z]. Then, the human capital investment follows






if τy < λ+ (s) + ψ
if τy ≥ λ+ (s) + ψ .







λ+ (s) + ψ
1
2
if s ≥ ((1 + β − 2ψ) /4− z) /ρ
if s ∈ [((η − ψ) /2− z) /ρ, ((1 + β − 2ψ) /4− z) /ρ)




1 + β −
p
β (2 + β)
´
/2. This leads to
Proposition 3 Assume that (24) and z < β/4. There are multiple Markov perfect equilibria,
where τy (s) follows (41) for any ψ ∈ [0, β − 4z].
6.1 Discussion
The above analyses suggest that suﬃcient uncertainty helps pin down a unique belief on future
political constituency. If z < β/4, τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
may induce two self-fulfilled beliefs,
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π = 0 or 1. Given any of the self-fulfilled beliefs, the tax rate τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
can be
utilized to eliminate uncertainty. Specifically, given the belief that π = 1 (0) for τy ≤ λ− (s)
(≥ λ+ (s)), any τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
can lead to a rightist (leftist) government in the next
period, irrespective of the current ideological state s. If z > β/4, large uncertainty weakens
the link between τy and the future actual political outcomes. Given any τy ∈
£
λ+ (s) , λ− (s)
¤
,
neither the left-wing nor the right-wing can be elected with probability one. Consequently,
individuals must use the current ideological state s as useful information to figure out all
possibilities of future political constituency and the corresponding policy outcomes. This
highlights the role of information which dictates an unique belief on π.
Morris and Shin (1998, 2000) applied a similar methodology to pin down a unique belief
in the financial market.34 They assume that agents receive diﬀerential information on funda-
mentals. Noisy information destroys the common knowledge. An agent must thus consider
all possible strategies of others based on its received information. The unique belief in our
model does not rely on diﬀerential information. Alternatively, it has roots in the imperfect
information about the evolution of political constituency.
There is another advantage of introducing ideological uncertainty. The indeterminacy in the
context without uncertainty has little to say about the shift in beliefs and the corresponding
switches between diﬀerent political regimes. Take Hassler et al. (2007) as an example. If
π = 0 (1), the left-wing (right-wing) will be the incumbent forever in all periods except
for the first election.35 This is apparently inconsistent with the observed political cycles.
Introducing electoral uncertainty provides a straightforward mechanism that switches beliefs
and the corresponding politico-economic equilibrium outcomes over time.
7 Conclusion
In spite of the growing literature on public policy decision-making in dynamic politico-economic
equilibrium, most works are silent on the role of ideological shifts, which tend to be persistent
and have a nontrivial influence on political outcomes. To explore the underlying mechanism of
policy decision-making under stochastic ideological movements, we develop a tractable model
to investigate the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice
and the evolution of political constituency. Our main finding is that the relationship between
the right-wing ideology and the size of government is positive within each political regime.
34The technique used in Herrendorf et al. (2000) is also related to ours. They find that suﬃcient heterogeneity
can rule out the multiplicity of equilibria in a two-sector growth model.
35 If the proportion of old rich exceeds 1/2, the right-wing wins the first election. Otherwise, the left-wing
wins.
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This distinguishes the literature of partisan politics predicting that ideology has no eﬀect on
public policies if the political regime remains unchanged. We document empirical evidence
from an OECD panel that supports our theory.
Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. For instance, our theory is completely silent
on the determination of public policies under coalition government. Moreover, the policy-
decision through the paper is static. When the government is allowed to borrow and agents
are altruistic towards their children, however, public choices may appear to be dynamic. In
a related work, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) introduce altruism and analyze the
determination of public debt in a stochastic ideological environment. In that model, however,
private choices are irrelevant for the evolution of political constituency. It will be interesting
for future research to incorporate altruism and public debt in the current setup, to see how
public intertemporal trade-oﬀ is interacted with private intertemporal choices.
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8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Apply the Schauder fixed point theorem. Let C be a set of bounded and uniformly continu-
ous functions mapping from [0, 1] ×X to [0, 1]. Define F = Rs0≥ τy−βα(τy,S)
2
f (s0, s) ds0, where
α (τy, s) ∈ C. We need to prove that the mapping F has a fixed point.
Let Ω = {F (α) , α ∈ C}. We first claim that Ω is equicontinuous, i.e., F (α) is bounded
and uniformly continuous for any α ∈ C. The boundedness is trivial since F (α) (τy, s) ≤R
f (s0, s) ds0 = 1. To prove that F (α) is uniformly continuous, we pick up any two vectors
x = (τy1, s1) and y = (τ
y
2, s2) from [0, 1]×X. It is straightforward to show that
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As kx− yk → 0, we have |(τy1 − τy2 − β (α (τy1, s1)− α (τy2, s2))) /2| kf (s0, s1)ksup → 0 by the
uniform continuity of α and kf (s0, s)ksup <∞ (A2). Moreover, from A1 and the boundedness
of α, it immediately follows that
¯¯¯¯







<∞ . By A2, kf (s0, s1)− f (s0, s2)ksup →
0 as kx− yk→ 0. Therefore, we have |F (α) (x)− F (α) (y)|→ 0 as kx− yk→ 0.
Next we check the conditions of the Schauder fixed point theorem (Theorem 17.4, Stokey
and Lucas, 1989). Ω has been to proved equicontinuous. And it is easily shown that C is
nonempty, closed and convex and F is continuous. Thus, all conditions are satisfied. ¤
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We only need to prove that, given any (τy, s), the following equation has a unique solution









A3 implies that dG (x) /dx = βf (s0, s) /2 < 1. The proof is complete by applying the contrac-
tion mapping theorem. ¤
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume that (24) and z > β/4.
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z (4z − β)− (4z − β) /2− βz
βρ
,
s2 ≡ 1− β −
p




16z2 − 6βz + 4z − β
ρ (16z − 2β) ,
sR ≡ (1− β) /4 + z
ρ
.
8.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The solution of maximizing (30) is straightforward under two polarized cases, i.e., s ≥ ((1− β) /2 + z) /ρ
and s ≤ −z/ρ. Thus, we need only to focus on s ∈ (−z/ρ, ((1− β) /2 + z) /ρ).
For notational convenience, we define
L (s) = max
τy∈(λ+(s),1]
TL (τy, s) τL (s) = argmax
τy∈(λ+(s),1]
TL (τy, s)
M (s) = max
τy∈(λ−(s),λ+(s))
TM (τy, s) τM (s) = argmax
τy∈(λ−(s),λ+(s))
TM (τy, s)
R (s) = max
τy∈[0,λ−(s)]











if s ≤ sL















if s > sMH







if s ≥ sR
if s < sR
, (47)
where




−16z2 + 2βz + 4z − β
ρ (16z − 2β) ,
and
sR > sMH > s
M
L , (48)
sR > sL > sML . (49)
We proceed by classifying the following six cases (see Table A-1), according to the conditions
in (45) and (46). Some results are immediate. By (49), the sixth case is empty. In Case 1-3,
s ≤ sL. So, τL (s) = 1/2. In Case 4 and 5, τL (s) = λ+ (s). The continuity of T (s) implies
that M (s) ≥ L (s). So we are left to compare M (s) and R (s) in Case 4 and 5.
Table A-1
Case 1: if Case 2: if Case 3: if Case 4: if Case 5: if Case 6: if















s > sMH s < s
M
L
Now let us consider the five cases in order. In the first case, τM (s) = φ (s). Moreover,
(48) and (47) give that s < sR and τR (s) = λ− (s). The continuity of T (s) implies that
M (s) > R (s). So we only need to compare L (s) and M (s). It immediately follows that

















z (4z − β)− (4z − β) /2− βz
βρ
. (50)
The other root is omitted since s1 > −z/ρ. It is easy to see that
s1 < sL. (51)
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> sML . (52)
(51) and (52) will be used in obtaining (55).
Turn to the second case where τM (s) = λ− (s). Since sL < sR, τR (s) = λ− (s) and
















































s2 ≥ s1, (54)
Similarly, since sML < s
R, τR (s) = τM (s) = λ− (s) and M (s) = R (s) in the third case. So
τy (s) follows the same rule as in the second case.
In the fourth case, τM (s) = φ (s). Moreover, (48) and (47) establish that s < sR and
τR (s) = λ− (s). Hence, M (s) > R (s) and τy (s) = φ (s).
Finally, the fifth case gives that τM (s) = λ− (s). If s ≤ sR, τR (s) is also equal to λ− (s)
and R (s) = M (s). On the other hand, if s > sR, τR (s) = (1 + β) /2, R (s) > M (s). So,
τy (s) = λ− (s) if s ≤ sR and τy (s) = (1 + β) /2 otherwise.
















































































































The first line on the RHS of (55) comes from the results in Case 1, 2 and 3. The second line
follows the results in Case 1 and 4. Case 2, 3, and 5 give the third line and the last line collects
the result from Case 5.
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To simplify (55), now we need to further classify two cases: sMH < s




β/z > (1 + β)
p
(4− β/z)
after some algebra. It follows that sMH < s
1 if and only if
z < zˆ.
When z < zˆ, (54) establishes that sMH < s
1 ≤ s2. Moreover, when z < zˆ, one can show that







β2 + 2β < 1/2 always holds, z ∈ (β/4, zˆ) is not an empty
set. Similarly, when z ≥ zˆ, (54) establishes that sMH ≥ s2 ≥ s1. Then (55) can be written as
(43). ¤
8.4 z ∈ (β/4, zˆ)
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if s > sR
. (57)
The proof is straightforward and immediately follows from Lemma 3, (19), (26) and (31).
One can see that the implications of Proposition 4 and 5 are qualitatively the same as Propo-
sition 1 and 2. It is worthy of noting that π (τy (s) , s) = 0 or 1. That is to say, there is no
electoral uncertainty under a small z.
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Figure 1: Panel A represents the equilibrium policy rule ( )syτ . The probability for 
the right-wing to be elected, ( )( )ssy ,τπ , is plotted in Panel B. Panel C corresponds to 
the equilibrium investment rule ( )( )ssh y ,τ . The parameter values are set equal to the 
benchmark case: 0.1,5.0,5.0 === βρz . 
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Figure 2: Panel A and B plot ( )sT y ,τ  with respect to yτ  under different ideological 
states. The parameter values are set equal to the benchmark case as in Figure 1. 
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   Regime
Left-Wing Regime
 
Figure 3: Panel A and B plot equilibrium sizes of government with respect to all 
possible ideological states, [ ]zszss +−∈ −− 11 ,ρρ , given different 1−s . The parameter 
values are set equal to the benchmark case. 
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Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis 
 





















Figure 4: Panel A and B plot the estimated a2 (solid line) and b2 (dotted line) with 
respect to z  and ρ , respectively. The other parameter values are held constant as in 




Table 1: OLS Estimation of the Determinants of Government Sizes (Simulated Data) 
Dep. Variable the size of government γ  















e - - 0.1010*** 
(55.16) 
R2 0.9792 0.9792 0.9805 




Table 2: OLS Estimation of the Determinants of Government Sizes 
Dep. Variable CGEXP CGREV CGEXP CGREV 



























No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 673 663 718 708 673 663 718 708 
Adj. R2 0.832 0.881 0.812 0.833 0.842 0.882 0.829 0.842 
Notes: Country dummies and year dummies are included to control for the fixed effects and time effects. Control variables are YPC (the log of 
real GDP per capita), YGAP (HP filtered YPC), openness, unemployment rate, and the sizes of population over 65 and below 14. Robust t 




Table 3: 2SLS Estimation of the Determinants of Government Sizes 
Dep. Variable CGEXP CGREV 



















No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 657 648 700 708 
Notes: Country dummies and year dummies are included to control for the fixed effects and time 
effects. R and RVOT are identified as endogenous. The corresponding instruments are the same 
variables, but one-year lagged. Control variables are YPC (the log of real GDP per capita), YGAP 
(HP filtered YPC), openness, unemployment rate, and the sizes of population over 65 and below 
14. t statistics is in brackets. ***, ** and * is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
